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INTRODUCTION
During the past "Year of the Woman," feminists and their allies subjected
a range of institutions to searching, well-publicized scrutiny. Women confronted
practices of sexual harassment, challenged their underrepresentation in
institutions, and questioned the double standards that have been applied to their
work. Even the military, often insulated from the tides of public opinion, has not
been immune from this scrutiny. Revelations of the Tailhook scandal,' and of
the ensuing cover-up, have brought pressure to bear on an institution slow to
acknowledge its legacy of harassment. Military exclusion policies, which for
many years met with quiescence or approval, have been challenged by straight
women, gays, and lesbians. An institution conceived by many as the symbol of
and training ground for traditional notions of masculinity2 has been forced to
confront a range of issues implicating gender.
The fact that the challenge has been raised, however, marks only a beginning.
Numerous questions remain about the arguments and the institutional
mechanisms through which change can best be achieved. Part 
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They must, first, expose the way in which those in positions of power make their
own perspectives normative, both as to the means of achieving military goals and
as to the characterization of nondominant groups, such as straight women, gays,
and lesbians. They must, second, trace this theme through a variety of military
policies and official responses to change. They must, finally, meet the official
images of nondominant groups with an array of images generated by group
members themselves and, in particular, resist the urge to describe groups by
reference to a singular, "good soldier" characterization. Part III considers the
institutional implications of this position, arguing that both courts and electoral
institutions possess certain advantages in combatting androcentrism. In the end,
the best solution may lie in institutional collaborations among the popular and
judicial branches-and the people-in order to promote new understandings of
gender and produce changes in gender-related policies.
II
EXPOSING ANDROCENTRISM AS A STRATEGY FOR CHANGE
Many military policies implicate questions of gender. Those which come
most readily to mind include the exclusion of women from combat roles, and
policies and practices related to sexual assault and harassment.' Also included
might be the military's exclusion of gays and lesbians, as this policy not only
affects the eligibility of thousands of women but helps to create the military's
image of what it means to be a man or a woman.4 Policies that relate to the
work/family conflict, such as those establishing the terms on which pregnant
women or mothers may serve,5 might also be placed within this category. With
what kinds of arguments these policies should be examined or challenged
remains an important issue, both at conceptual and strategic levels.
3. Women's combat restrictions are imposed by statute in the case of the Navy and the Air Force.
See Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 528 (repealed 1991) (prohibiting the assignment of women
in the Air Force "to duty in aircraft engaged in combat missions"); 10 U.S.C. § 6015 (Supp. III 1991)
(prohibiting the assignment of Navy women "to duty on vessels or aircraft that engage in combat
missions"). The other services have no statutory restrictions eliminating women from combat, although
the Army in 1977 adopted a Combat Exclusion Policy, which prevents women from serving in certain
jobs designated as "combat" military occupational specialties, and the Marine Corps, which comes under
the command of the Navy Department, is subject to the restriction on women in 10 U.S.C. § 6015. See
generally M.C. DEVILBISS, WOMEN AND MILITARY SERVICE: A HISTORY, ANALYSIS AND OVERVIEW
OF KEY ISSUES 25 (1990).
4. This policy is not prescribed by an act of Congress, but by Defense Department regulation. This
policy states in part: "Homosexuality is incompatible with military service. The presence in the military
environment of persons who engage in homosexual conduct or who, by their statements, demonstrate
a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct, seriously impairs the accomplishment of the military
mission." Enlisted Administrative Separations, 32 C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A, pt. 1(H)(1)(a) (1992).
5. Exec. Order No. 10,240, 3 C.F.R. 749 (1949-1953), reprinted in 10 U.S.C.A. § 3818 note (West
1959) (requiring the mandatory separation of military women who became pregnant or became the
parent of a natural, adopted or stepchild under a certain age). During the early 1970s, several services
mitigated the harshness of this rule by granting waivers to some pregnant women or mothers. In 1974,
the Department of Defense told the services that they should develop policies making separation for
pregnancy and motherhood voluntary rather than mandatory. See JUDITH STIEHM, ARMS AND THE
ENLISTED WOMAN 117 (1989).
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A. The Problem-Specific Focus
In the past, feminists and other advocates of gender equality have ap-
proached change primarily in a problem-specific manner. They have opposed
the gay/lesbian exclusion or challenged the adequacy of policies relating to sexual
harassment, for example, rather than seeking connections among problem areas,
or between problem areas and more pervasive characteristics of military
institutions. This problem-specific emphasis made sense in several respects.
First, some advocates may not have seen connections among different policies,
or they may have believed that the differences between work/family policies, for
example, and gay/lesbian exclusion were more significant than the similarities.
Second, advocates may have perceived strategic reasons for persisting in single-
problem efforts. Broader-based challenges might require coalitions they were
reluctant to forge,6 or threaten progress that appeared possible in narrower
areas. Most importantly, problem-specific approaches seemed most likely to be
palatable to the military leaders who were the targets of advocacy. These leaders
perceive their institution to be a superb problem solver: abundant analytic and
implementational resources, rigid hierarchical structure, and strict discipline all
make the military an excellent forum for devising and implementing solutions to
particular problems, including those involving group-based inequalities.7
Military leaders have also responded with anger, but little comprehension, to
systematic challenges to the nature or "culture" of their institutions. A good
example is the recent furor over Carol Burke's article Dames at Sea.' Burke,
a former instructor at the Naval Academy, reflected on the connections between
the Tailhook scandal and the misogynistic marching chants, rituals, and jokes in
which midshipmen engage on a more routine basis.9 She concluded that "[w]hat
happened at the Tailhook reunion was both traditional and criminal. Although
a thorough criminal investigation may identify the perpetrators ... the deep-
6. Homophobic tendencies in the mainstream feminist movement, for example, may have made
straight feminists, protesting the women's combat exclusion, reluctant to join forces with gays and
lesbians protesting their exclusion from the services.
7. See e.g., Charles Moskos, How Do They Do It?, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 5, 1991, at 16.
8. Carol Burke, Dames at Sea, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 17 & 24, 1992, at 16.
9. Although these chants and jokes may be routine, from Burke's description they appear to be
far from benign. Consider a variation on the traditional song "The Prettiest Girl":
The ugliest girl I ever did see
was beating her face against a tree
I picked her up; I punched her twice;
She said, "Oh Middy, you're much too nice."
Or two verses from the chant "My Girl Is a Vegetable":
My Girl ain't got no eyes
Just two sockets full o' flies....
Sometimes I even play a joke
Pull the plugs and watch her choke.
Burke, supra note 8, at 18.
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rooted misogynistic traditions that breed such behavior will be harder to
uproot."'" Burke's article was greeted with a storm of criticism from Naval
Academy officials. Some accused her of disloyalty in airing the Academy's dirty
linen in public; others challenged the veracity of her account, arguing that
because newly-minted rules proscribed such behavior, it could not have occurred;
most claimed to find her account of a misogynistic "culture" unrecognizable and
unhelpful as a prescription for change.1'
Yet complicated and controversial as it may be, an approach which links a
range of problems to each other, and to their roots in an androcentric military
culture may be necessary to produce progress. Recent evidence suggests that,
despite their apparent advantages, problem-specific approaches have backfired
in troubling-though ultimately not surprising-ways. Two examples help to
illustrate this difficulty.
The first comes from the area of sexual harassment. The pervasive sexual
harassment discovered on the USS Safeguard produced massive Department of
Defense and Navy studies, and resulted in the adoption of a "no tolerance"
policy toward sexual harassment.12 Yet no sooner was this policy in place than
the Tailhook scandal erupted. Not only was the investigation of that scandal
thwarted by official hostility and frank attempts to protect responsible colleagues,
the commander of the Naval Investigative Service responded by comparing
female aviators to "go-go dancers, topless dancers or hookers."13 Moreover,
when women's advocates attempted to make the point that the women's combat
exclusion helped to perpetuate second class citizenship of which harassment was
another part,14 most military leaders voiced a complete inability to comprehend
a connection. These developments underscore the very point made by Burke,
that even a "no tolerance" policy is not going to produce satisfactory results if
10. Id. at 20.
11. Interview with Associate Dean Carol Burke, Dec. 6, 1993 (notes on file with author). See also
Correspondence, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 21, 1992, at 4-5 (letter from Admiral T.C. Lynch,
Superintendent of the Naval Academy calling Dames at Sea "an inaccurate portrayal of today's
environment at the [Academy]," in light of changes in official rules, including a "zero tolerance program
for any gender discrimination or harassment"; reply from Carol Burke detailing sexist practices that
continued after official policies were implemented). A less decorous response may be found in a letter
to the President of Johns Hopkins University, the institution for which Burke left the Naval Academy,
from John Sheehan, Vice Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Naval Academy's Alumni
Association. In a clear effort to discredit Burke with her new employer ("were I president of one of the
nation's great universities, and had I a dean on my staff who would stoop to such filth-liberated woman
though she may be-I would want to be informed about that"), Sheehan states "[wjhat Ms. Burke has
written is so bizarre and so far beyond anyone's comprehension of what goes on at the Naval Academy
that none of us can understand her motivation." In a revealing aside, Sheehan suggests that the article
may have been published to vindicate the prejudice of New Republic Editor Andrew Sullivan-"an
avowed homosexual"-against the military. Letter of John Sheehan to William Richardson, President
of Johns Hopkins University, Aug. 28, 1992 (on file with author).
12. Ron Martz, Military is Beginning to Change Attitudes, ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 5, 1992, at C4 (all
four service chiefs have adopted "no tolerance" policy on sexual harassment); Editorial, Navy at Its
Brassiest, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 1, 1992, at A24 (citing adoption of "no tolerance" policy by Navy in 1990).
13. Eric Schmitt, Senior Navy Officers Suppressed Sex Investigation, Pentagon Says, N.Y. TIMEs,
Sept. 25, 1992, at Al.
14. Id.
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those responsible for enforcing it have not come to recognize the ways in which
systematic devaluation of women pervades their attitudes and institutions.
The second example concerns the area of gay and lesbian exclusion. In
January 1993, President Clinton moved, through a proposed executive order, to
end the ban on gays and lesbians in the military services.15 Following vocal
opposition by the Joint Chiefs of Staff16 and a threatened congressional
rebellion spearheaded by Senator Sam Nunn," Clinton delayed imposition of
the executive order for six months, in order to study approaches to implementa-
tion. 8 Within days, reports surfaced that among the alternatives for implemen-
tation being considered were a ban on gays and lesbians in combat, and the
establishment of segregated barracks and showers, in order to "respect the
privacy of heterosexuals." 19 There was, on the other hand, no consideration of
whether the end of gay and lesbian exclusion should be accompanied by some
revision in the uniform military code outlawing sodomy. Indeed, under the new
policy, which restricts military inquiry and investigation, homosexual conduct-as
well as acts such as hand-holding, which demonstrate "a propensity or intent to
engage in homosexual acts"-remain a basis for separation, and "credible
information of homosexual acts" provides grounds for investigation.2" These
developments suggest that the modification of the ban will be accompanied by
the continuing stigmatization of gays and lesbians, rather than by reexamination
of the complex set of attitudes that produced it.
These difficulties have arisen because partisans on both sides have become
accustomed to seeing specific gender policies in isolation. Had advocacy on the
gay and lesbian exclusion been more consistently joined with advocacy on the
(straight) women's combat exclusion, it might not have been so easy for Clinton
Administration officials to contemplate going from a complete ban on gays and
lesbians to a combat ban. Had women's advocates more systematically
15. Eric Schmitt, Clinton Set to End Ban on Gay Troops, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1993, at Al.
16. Eric Schmitt, Joint Chiefs Fighting Clinton Plan to Allow Homosexuals in Military, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 1993, at Al.
17. Adam Clymer, Lawmakers Revolt On Lifting Gay Ban in Military Service, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,
1993, at Al; Michael Wines, This Time, Nunn Tests a Democrat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1993, at Al.
18. Gwen Ifill, Clinton Accepts Delay in Lifting Military Gay Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1993, at Al.
19. Eric Schmitt, Pentagon Aides to Study Option of Segregation for Gay Soldiers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
31, 1993, at Al. In his first official press conference, President Clinton surprised many observers by
expressing his willingness to consider segregation of gay and lesbian soldiers, should the forthcoming
Pentagon report recommend it. See Richard L. Berke, Clinton Says He'd Consider Separating Gay
Troops: Remarks Are Contrasted With Earlier Stand on the Military, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1993, at Al.
20. See Text of Pentagon's New Policy Guidelines on Homosexuals in the Military, July 20, 1993,
at A16. See also Sam Verhovek, Gay Groups Denounce the Pentagon's New Policy, N.Y. TIMES, July
21, 1993, at A14. The implementation of this policy was suspended in the wake of a federal district court
decision enjoining any action by the military that affects the enlistment siatus of, or results in the
creating or maintaining of records on, gay and lesbian service members in the absence of proven sexual
conduct--"if such conduct is proven to interfere with the military mission of the armed forces."
Meinhold v. Department of Defense, CV 92-6044 TJH, Amended Order and Judgment, September 30,
1993 [unpublished order on file with author]. However, last month, the Supreme Court prepared the
way for the implementation of the policy, by staying the court's order, on the ground that the district
court could only order Meinhold's reinstatement. See Linda Campbell, Clinton Gay Policy Gets Legal
Alert, Court imperils "don't ask, don't tell' standard, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 17, 1993 at 1.
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connected a range of women's issues, military officials might not have been so
perplexed by the claim that the combat exclusion bestows a kind of second class
citizenship that facilitates or legitimates sexual harassment. But the problem
with single-issue strategies goes beyond the failure to juxtapose related policies
or issues. It lies in the failure to offer the kinds of explanations that juxtaposing
and comparing policies makes possible.
Recent efforts at reform have treated discrimination in the military as if it
arises from a simple cognitive error or category mistake: military personnel do
not understand that harassing women is unacceptable or that gays and lesbians
can function as soldiers. All that is necessary is to correct these errors-by
imposing a "no tolerance" policy, for example-and the problem will disappear.
The foregoing problems indicate that this is not the case. I would argue instead
that discriminatory behavior and policies should be described as arising from a
complex intersection of attitudes and structures built on those attitudes that I will
describe as androcentrism. Specific policies must be treated within a painstaking
elaboration of this larger problem before effective reforms can be devised.
B. Androcentrism in the Military
Androcentrism, a term which traces its origins back to Charlotte Perkins
Gilman in the early twentieth century,21  has several components.
Androcentrism is based on the premise that the structure of the society or
institution in question is "patriarchal": that is, that all of the relevant positions
of power are held by men.' Yet, as feminist theorist Sandra Bem points out,
the more important meaning of androcentrism lies in three additional premises.
First, those men who hold the positions of power describe the world through
their own eyes, yet think that they have described the world as it exists in some
universal, objective sense.' Second, these men define other people in relation
to themselves as either being the same or being different.24 Third, those who
are classified as different are "otherized"-that is, characterized as being as alien
and non-normative as possible-and their value or function is depicted only in
relation to the dominant group, rather than as they themselves might see it.2
Explanations emphasizing androcentrism thus focus not on the characteristics of
the group suffering discrimination-be it straight women, gay men, or lesbi-
ans-but on the power held by the dominant group and the way it permits them
to shape determinative understandings of the world, and the nature and role of
others.
21. See CHARLOTE PERKINS GILMAN, THE MAN MADE WORLD OR OUR ANDROCENTRIC
CULTURE (1911), cited in SANDRA BEM, THE LENSES OF GENDER: TRANSFORMING THE DEBATE ON
SEXUAL INEQUALITY 41 (1993).
22. See BEM, supra note 21, at 40.
23. Id. at 42.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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Androcentrism has been a critical explanatory concept in addressing gender
discrimination in civilian workplaces. Efforts to end women's exclusion from
professional and blue-collar jobs began not by examining the source and
evolution of workplace norms, but by accepting them at face value. Women
argued that they should be granted access to jobs because they could perform
them the same way as men.26 This argument prevailed in many battles for
access, but it turned out to be an incomplete solution.27 When women entered
the workplace, they discovered that performing these jobs the same way as men
meant performing them on a full-time, consistent basis throughout their careers,
without accommodation of their (starkly different) responsibilities for home and
family.' It also meant performing these jobs in environments where they were
subject to both subtle and blatant derogation and to sexual harassment ranging
from verbal epithets to sexual assault.29  And it meant discovering that the
characteristics of good performance according to which their work was
judged-be it firefighting or lawyering-were oddly coterminous with male
physical capacity or socialization.
These difficulties were not effectively combatted by the arguments that had
won women access. In relation to the work/family conflict and male standards
of job performance, these arguments only exacerbated women's difficulties by
exposing them to arguments that they "wanted it both ways" in the workplace. °
Arguments that women could work the same way as men did little to explain
why they were hindered and offended by sexualized conduct-much of which
had long been part of predominantly male workplaces. It was only as women
stopped emphasizing their ability to conform to pre-existing standards and
started challenging the origins and partiality of these standards that they gained
the flexibility necessary to address a number of different problems in a consistent
and mutually reinforcing fashion.
The newer arguments stressed that by virtue of ongoing male control of most
workplaces, the norms that structured the workplace were developed by and for
men.3' The male biography defined the proper extent of commitment to a job;
26. See Kathryn Abrams, Roving Biologism, Social Construction and Reasonable Women: A
Response to Professor Epstein, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1021 (1993) [hereinafter Abrams, Roving Biologism];
Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV.
1183 (1989) [hereinafter Abrams, Gender Discrimination].
27. The same can be said of the second strategy employed by women in the workplace: arguing
that they worked differently from men. See Abrams, Roving Biologism, supra note 26; Joan Williams,
Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989).
28. See Abrams, Gender Discrimination, supra note 26; Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The
Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (1989); Mary Joe Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility
to Working Mothers, 59 B.U. L. REV. 55 (1979); Williams, supra note 27.
29. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE
OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979); Abrams, Gender Discrimination, supra note 26.
30. These claims structured the seemingly endless "equal treatment/special treatment" debate in the
area of pregnancy benefits and family leave. See Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A
Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986); Herma Hill Kay,
Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1985).
31. See Gender Discrimination, supra note 26.
Page 217: Autumn 1993]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
the male physiology or socialization established the qualities that conduced to
good performance.32 The male need for entertainment, company, or conquest
determined the degree of sexual conduct that was appropriate on the job. Until
it was challenged by feminist advocates, this inevitable correspondence was not
called male power or male perspectivity; it was simply called "work." Feminist
advocates also pointed out that women were effectively characterized as "other"
at work. Their persistent sexualization through propositions, epithets, and
pornography constructed them as different from men, and deserving of
devaluation. Insensitivity to the partiality of established standards led men to
ascribe women's failures to meet them as defects in women, which also served
to reinforce their differences. Whether by sexualizing women, holding them to
partial standards, creating sex-segregated ghettos of female service workers, or
characterizing them in relation to nonworkplace roles (such as mother, sister,
wife) rather than by reference to their professional setting, men in the workplace
thought about women in relation to themselves, rather than as beings in their
own right. This critique has allowed women to explain more effectively why
sexual harassment is a problem, or why it is wrong to insist on uninterrupted,
full-time workplace participation or to judge women for being insufficiently
aggressive. It has demanded of workplace managers that they ask who holds the
power and whether they exercise it equitably in relation to an increasingly plural
workforce.
A similar critique holds promise in the military area, for the military, like
most civilian workplaces, displays many features of androcentrism. First, the
military is undeniably patriarchal: virtually all positions of power are held by
men-in this case it is significant to add-heterosexual men.33  Second, these
men describe the world through their own eyes and purport to have described
it in its essence. The perspectivity, or partiality, of their view is often difficult
32. A similar argument is made regarding the workplace and other contexts by Catharine
MacKinnon. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 36 (1987) ("... their socially designed biographies define workplace
expectations ... Their presence defines family, their inability to get along with each other.., defines
history, their image defines god, and their genitals define sex."). These factors lead MacKinnon to
conclude that "the structure and values of American society" constitute an "affirmative action plan" for
men. Id. at 36. MacKinnon offers what might be described as a version of androcentrism. It assumes
that men hold positions of power and operate as the measure of all things in our society, and it argues
that men conceal the perspectivity of their world view in claims of universality or objectivity. But it
describes what Bem calls the process of "other-izing" in a more particularized fashion. Women are not
simply constructed as alien and devalued but, more specifically, as sexualized and subordinate. Men
maintain their power not simply through the power of description (and related non-violent social powers
of construction) but through acts of sexualized violence and aggression against women. Id. at 40-45.
33. It is also true that most positions of power are held by white heterosexual men. Charles Moskos
reported that in the Army, for example, there are only 85,000 noncommissioned black officers, 7,000
black officers and 26 black generals (representing 6% of all generals), including of course Colin Powell,
the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Moskos, supra note 7, at 18, 20. However, while the
numbers remain small, there are not, as in the case of gay men, formal barriers to black access; on the
contrary, the military has implemented programs deemed by some to be more effective than civilian
efforts to integrate black soldiers and mitigate prejudice. See id.
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to identify, because divergences from the views of other observers are defended
on the basis of expertise.
This latter pattern can be observed with respect to claims of combat
effectiveness. Many exclusionary policies, such as the gay and lesbian ban or the
(straight) women's combat ban, are justified on the ground that the presence of
these groups in the combat arms would disrupt military discipline and make
effective defense impossible. 4  Competing claims by advocates of excluded
groups are met with the argument that the experience of the Joint Chiefs, or the
leaders of a particular service, enables them to be the best judges of what
conduces to combat effectiveness. This claim is difficult to meet precisely
because it is partly true. Military leaders do have more training and experience
than anyone else in what conduces to combat effectiveness. But this training has
also taken place in a particular setting, with particular colleagues, who share
particular attitudinal assumptions. The insulation of this group within, and its
virtually uncontested control over, military institutions has reinforced these
homogeneous attitudes. It is often difficult to tell whether a particular
conclusion about combat effectiveness is informed by technical knowledge of the
requirements of combat, familiarity with or commitment to a way in which
combat has traditionally been conducted, or both.35 Often it requires an exigent
circumstance, which suspends dominant assumptions to determine whether it is
the technical requirements of combat or the assumptions of those waging it that
justify a particular exclusion.
One such circumstance was Truman's executive order requiring racial
integration of the armed forces. Military leaders had argued fervently that
integrating units would disrupt military discipline, and that white soldiers would
refuse to serve under or take orders from black superiors. Yet when the order
was issued, military leaders realized that they had to put their experience to work
implementing rather than resisting integration. Although the resulting struggles
continued for many years,36 including times when black soldiers responded
angrily to both civilian racial strife and continuing discrimination in the military
34. See Schmitt, supra note 16, at Al; JEANNE HOLM, WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: THE
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 341 (1982) (citing Retired Gen. Westmoreland as testifying that proposals
to place women in combat show "utter disregard for potential fighting effectiveness ... no man with
gumption wants a woman to fight his battles").
35. An analogy to the civilian workplace might be useful here. Parents (most frequently mothers)
seeking to mitigate work/family conflict have sometimes asked their employers to implement job-sharing.
Many times employers respond with the argument that a particular job cannot be shared if a satisfactory
product or service is to be rendered. Although the employer has significant experience with what
conduces to a good performance of a particular job in his (her) workplace, most workplaces have been
structured in a way that requires each job to be performed solely by a particular person. So while
experience, in the sense of technical knowledge, may be one factor informing an employer's refusal to
consider job-sharing, experience, in the sense of familiarity with or exposure to only one mode of
operation, can be another. To overcome the latter barrier it has often been necessary to experiment with
job sharing, or to study the experience of workplaces in which single-occupant job roles have not been
assumed.
36. Moskos, supra note 7, at 16. Some soldiers argue that these difficulties have yet to be fully
resolved. Moskos quotes a number of black soldiers as contending that "[t]he whites are still top dog"
in the armed forces, and "the brothers know it." Id.
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ranks, the military implemented a series of programs which have mitigated racial
tensions and equalized opportunity to a degree rarely achieved in civilian
society.37 During the armed combat in Desert Storm, for example, there were
no racial incidents severe enough to be brought to the attention of military
police.3
8
A more limited example comes from the Vietnam War. A traditional
argument raised against women in ground combat is that they lack the size and
upper body strength necessary to wage effective combat.39 Yet during the
Vietnam War, the United States was compelled to arm and train a fighting force
that possessed at least one of these drawbacks. The South Vietnamese troops
were, on average, considerably smaller than the caucasian and black men that
make up the majority of the U.S. fighting force. Because the nature of the
conflict did not permit the United States to refuse to assist such troops, the
military took another route: it took overseas a weapon, the M-16, that was
smaller, lighter and could more effectively be used by troops the size of the
average Vietnamese man.4 Once inclusion of troops with different physical
characteristics became a priority, military technical knowledge was put to work
to make accommodation possible.
Recognizing this aspect of androcentrism in the military does not mean
rejecting, or even contesting, all claims of military expertise. It means
acknowledging that expertise can mean not only greater technical knowledge, but
more consistent exposure to shared attitudes or contextual limitations: for
example, the expectation that one will and should share the exigencies of combat
with other straight men. It requires a vigorous effort to identify these different
threads in experience and to use technical knowledge where necessary to
overcome attitudinal limitations.
The third feature of androcentrism present in the military is that those in
power define everyone else in relation to themselves, as either the same or
different: those who are different are characterized as being polar, alien, or
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Karst, supra note 2, at 523 (citing physical arguments in favor of combat exclusion); The
Argument Against Female Combatants, in FEMALE SOLDIERS-COMBATANTS OR NONCOMBATANTS?:
HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 247 (Nancy Goldman ed., 1982). Those who take a
more positive view of women in combat are divided between those who are willing to acknowledge the
relevance of strength differentials in some areas but emphasize the many areas in which they do not
affect performance, see, e.g., HOLM, supra note 34, at 396, and those who emphasize the fact that the
services' approaches to measuring and implementing policy relating to strength differentials are too
inconsistent to permit conclusions as to their relevance, see, e.g., STIEHM, supra note 5, at 198-205.
40. See Karst, supra note 2, at 532. Karst also notes that the M-16 was used by Captain Linda Bray
in her now-famous exchange of fire in Panama. Id. That a similar effort to supplement size and strength
with technology-permitting women into combat as fighter pilots or on combat ships-has generated
significant controversy suggests that it may be expectations, as much as expertise, that ground the
reluctance in this case. See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE ASSIGNMENT OF WOMEN IN THE
ARMED FORCES, MEMORANDUM: APPROVED RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (1992) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION] (stating that law and policies should be modified to permit women to serve on combat
vessels; but laws and policies prohibiting women from assignment to duty on aircraft engaged in combat
missions should be retained, codified or re-enacted).
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without value. This is true not only of the way that the military characterizes
enemies in wartime, but of the way heterosexual males in the armed forces
characterize others within their ranks. Kenneth Karst has offered a cogent
explanation of the psychological function served by this devaluation of straight
women, gays, and lesbians: it reasserts the value of, and associates the dominant
group more strongly with, the elusive, highly-charged, anxiety-producing
traditional norm of masculinity.41 I am less concerned with the motive,
however, than with the regularity with which such distancing and devaluation
occur, and the mechanisms through which they are effected. Military cadence
calls, jokes, and rituals that describe women as ugly, overweight, unsanitary, or
masochistic serve this function,42 as do sexual assault and sexual harassment of
enlisted women. The recent depiction of "overt homosexuals" as perpetually
cruising predators who will treat straight soldiers as sexual objects provides
another example.43 Exclusion policies, such as the gay and lesbian exclusion and
the (straight) women's combat exclusion, accomplish a similar purpose in a
subtler way. Although such exclusions do not, on their face, stigmatize straight
women, lesbians, or gay men, they set them apart from straight male soldiers,
and the justifications that are offered in their defense may be more overtly
stigmatizing.
Finally, military leaders view groups which are "other" according to the
function they serve in, or the effect that they have on, the lives of the dominant
group. They do not view excluded groups as beings in their own right; that is,
the groups' own perspectives, or views of themselves, are not taken into account.
When the Clinton Administration proposed ending the gay and lesbian ban, the
question was the effect that gay soldiers' (uncloseted) presence would produce
on the dominant group: this was the reason for the pervasive concern with the
"privacy of heterosexual soldiers." At no point did military leaders view the
matter from the perspective of gays and lesbians, asking how it would feel to be
excluded, segregated, or restricted from combat, or how it would feel to be
included under circumstances where some preferred forms of sexual contact-far
from being celebrated in the fashion of heterosexual soldiers-were designated
a violation of military law.
41. See Karst, supra note 2, at 506-07.
42. See Burke, supra note 8, at 18.
43. The emergence of and emphasis on the term "overt homosexual"-with the derogatory, highly
sexualized images it connotes-has been an interesting feature of the current debate over the gay and
lesbian exclusion. The term appears to have emerged in response to the (accurate) claim that there are,
at present, thousands of closeted gays and lesbians serving in the armed forces. It reflects an
understanding, sometimes made explicit by military leaders, that if gays and lesbians are required to hide
their sexual orientation, their divergent sexuality will not disrupt military discipline; but, if they are
permitted to come out to other soldiers, their sexualized, predatory culture will envelop the military.
As former National Public Radio correspondent Frank Browning-a gay man-has observed, this
depiction represents an interesting reversal of the stereotypic characterization of gays and straights:
"we're the tigers and they're the poofs." Fresh Air, Interview with Frank Browning (March 10, 1993).
This understanding, of course, rests on equally stereotyped images of gays and lesbians, which I argue
are both contested and abetted by the "good soldier" approach taken by opponents of the exclusion.
See infra text accompanying notes 46-51.
Page 217: Autumn 1993]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
C. Exposing Androcentrism: Elements of Strategy
What sort of strategy is implied by the recognition that androcentrism lies at
the heart of numerous gender-specific policies? Several elements are particularly
important. The first is to offer detailed accounts of the partiality and perpetua-
tion of dominant, straight male perspectives, as I have attempted above.
Androcentrism relies, in a paradoxical way, on the invisibility of these
perspectives: when they are taken not as a point of view, but as "military life,"
androcentrism is particularly secure. Explaining the mechanisms for the
generation and perpetuation of these perspectives makes them seem less
universal and inevitable; it makes them more vulnerable to challenge by those
who can advance alternative views.
Detailed explanations of the elements and devices of androcentrism may also
be useful in educating resistant military leaders. References to military "culture"
may be vague enough to make even well-meaning officials throw up their hands;
but elaboration of the particular means through which specific attitudes and
characterizations become shared truths may be more effective. Of course, an
immediate positive response is hardly to be expected; the reception of Carol
Burke's admirably concrete attempt to connect seemingly inconsequential habits
and customs with larger patterns of gender oppression is a chastening example.
But the more fully and more frequently military leaders are confronted with
accounts of these dynamics, the more familiar they will become.
This last point previews the second element of a strategy associated with the
exposure of institutional androcentrism. More general discussion of
androcentrism must be used to explain both specific policies and the military
response to change. For example, the androcentrism critique explains the
inadequacy of military response to the single-problem areas described earlier.
It should be no surprise, in light of this critique, that the adoption of a "no
tolerance" policy in regard to sexual harassment has not solved the problem.
The policy conflicts with a range of other messages military personnel receive
that women are pejoratively, debilitatingly different and do not belong. Until
military leaders begin to realize how pervasive such derogatory attitudes are and
how many hindering official and unofficial forms they can take, it will be difficult
to address the problem more fully.
Similarly, androcentrism makes it possible to explain how alternatives like
segregation and combat exclusion have followed attempts to end the ban on gays
and lesbians. Gays and lesbians are not only effectively "other-ized" within the
military; they are considered primarily by reference to their impact on the lives
of heterosexual males. So it is not surprising that the first questions raised by
their integration were how to protect the "privacy" of straight men and how to
preserve combat effectiveness in a force that leaders had always (if not always
correctly) conceived of as consisting exclusively of straight male soldiers. If the
gay and lesbian ban is not to be succeeded by other similarly stigmatizing
measures, military leaders must learn to consider questions of inclusion from the
perspectives of nondominant groups as well.
[Vol. 56: No. 4
GENDER IN THE MILITARY
A final strategic consideration concerns the generation of oppositional
images. Part of the strength of androcentrism lies in its power to characterize
nondominant groups in ways that facilitate their continued subordination. These
images, like the understandings of what conduces to military discipline, are often
taken not as perspectives but as facts. Generating opposing images of these
groups can be important not only in making visible the partiality of these
perspectives but in supplying alternatives that might inform military
decisionmaking.
One critical question concerns the kind of oppositional images that should be
generated. Over the past few years, the predominant model for characterizing
members of the affected group(s) has been the "good soldier." Straight women,
gays, and lesbians who are subject to exclusion from one or more facets of
military service have been characterized as highly competent members of the
armed forces, who discharge their present duties with skill and commitment, and
are capable of enhanced responsibilities. Women have the capacity to conceive
children, but their childbearing is likely to be postponed and their fertility kept
under "military" discipline. Gays and lesbians perform their duties with
distinction and without making anyone aware of their sexual orientation.
In some respects, this "good soldier" characterization seems to be a
reasonable strategy. Many of those targeted by the policies discussed here are
in fact good soldiers, whose difference in gender or sexual orientation has little,
if any, impact on their performance.' More importantly, the appeal to the
dominant norms of the challenged institution-like civilian feminists' invocation
of women's similarities to men-has seemed to be a strategically safe approach.
By characterizing stigmatized groups according to the military's own criteria,
advocates would seem to minimize the number of contested issues and maximize
their chance of persuading military leaders.
Yet as feminist experience with civilian workplaces suggests, this "safe"
strategy does not always produce the desired change, and often entails
problematic consequences. In particular, the "good soldier" approach-like the
"sameness" approach to the civilian workplace that preceded it-undermines the
broader effort at gender equality by accepting two central premises of the
androcentric world view. First, it accepts the view of professional standards
promulgated by the dominant group without challenging its premises, origins, or
perspectivity. And second, it accepts the androcentric practice of measuring
44. Some, such as the gay and lesbian soldiers who have recently challenged the exclusion policy
in court and in the media, are exemplary members of the service, whose loss has been or would be
deeply felt by those with whom they work. See Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.
1988), affd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990);
Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
In addition, social and technological changes have in fact mitigated some of the factors that
impeded women in their efforts to become good soldiers. Contraception has made it possible for women
to control their fertility; the advent and growing social acceptance of organized childcare has made it at
least theoretically possible for women with children to pursue ambitious and time-consuming careers.
See Michelle Benecke, Beyond Fighter Pilots: Exploding the Military's Combat Exclusion Policy
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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others by the standard of the dominant group and finding them either
(collectively) similar or (collectively) different.
As we saw above, a critical component of androcentrism is the power to
present dominant understandings as inherent in the nature of the institutions,
rather than as connected to the identity or experience of those who hold power
within them. As women have discovered in civilian workplaces, accepting
dominant (male) definitions of job performance perpetuates this power in several
ways. First, it tends to depict job performance requirements as static, rather than
subject to ongoing revision, even within androcentric institutions. The "good
soldier" calls up legitimating images of hand-to-hand ground combat and fighter
pilots dodging anti-aircraft fire, but it relinquishes the opportunity to emphasize
the increasing pluralism of "soldierly" roles-that is, one can also be a good
soldier by aiming scud missiles, miles away from the intended target-some of
which may operate to the advantage of nondominant groups like women.45
Adopting the dominant standards of job performance foregoes the important
opportunity to disentangle the demands of the institutional setting from the
perspectives of those currently exercising power within it. If feminists in
professional civilian workplaces had continued to take established performance
criteria as given, they would never have been able to challenge attributes ranging
from a "commanding" manner to uninterrupted career emphasis to single-
occupant jobs as functions of the male biography rather than of the work at
hand.' These kinds of understandings will be critical in the military context as
well, as nondominant groups begin the task of separating the requirements of
combat from the expectations and assumptions of those heterosexual males who
have historically comprised the fighting force.
Moreover, uncritical acceptance of the dominant standards of performance
sends a problematic message about who should bear the burden of accommoda-
tion as women enter a new workforce. Embracing existing standards suggests
that women should conform their conduct to existing rules. By failing to make
the point that institutions do and should change as they adapt to increasingly
pluralistic constituencies, nondominant groups perpetuate the myth that current
leaders have captured the essence of the job in question, and cede moral high
ground that they could use in making demands for institutional change. 7
45. See Michelle Benecke, supra note 44, at 5-8 (explaining that women may actually have
advantages in certain kinds of combat, which are obscured when their qualifications are determined by
reference to a male standard).
46. Acceptance of dominant standards for performance can also foster an elitism which produces
unnecessary and injurious distinctions among members of the excluded group. In professional
workplaces, for example, "male" characteristics including credentials and personal manner did not turn
out to be equally distributed among or accessible to all contending women. The ability to compile a
resume which resembled that of a man's tended to be correlated with race and socioeconomic privilege.
The ability to develop a personal manner that avoided the twin evils of departing too much from the
male model and simulating it so precisely as to induce anxiety in male evaluators tended to be found
among more privileged women as well. See generally MACKINNON, supra note 32, at 70-77.
47. They also leave themselves without recourse if and when it becomes obvious that certain
previously excluded groups cannot completely conform to dominant standards framed without the new
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The "good soldier" characterization also fuels the androcentric notion that
all groups are unitary in nature and should be described as either similar to or
different from the dominant group. Perpetuating the dominant group as a point
of reference is one problem: what is needed is to present nondominant groups
through their own eyes, as subjects in their own right, rather than in relation.
But to invoke unity, on the one hand, and similarity, on the other, creates further
difficulties. Asserting similarity may be a losing battle in a setting where the
dominant group is committed to constructing difference and has many resources
at hand through which to do so. Feminists have also learned through hard
experience the dangers of engaging in unitary representations.
Predictably, the view which is universalized reflects the lives or circumstances
of more privileged women," and the marginalization of the less privileged
replicates within the group the logic and hierarchy of androcentric institutions.
49
The monolithic image of the "good soldier," whose sexual orientation plays no
role in his or her interaction with fellow soldiers, could marginalize those who,
like some straight soldiers, wish to be more forthcoming about the details of their
personal lives."0 The "good soldier" image might also submerge within military
entrants in mind. In her article "Beyond Fighter Pilots," Michelle Benecke argues that by emphasizing
the highly successful (and largely conforming) performance of female pilots in the Gulf War, women's
combat advocates have failed to shed adequate light on the ways in which women soldiers do not and
cannot conform to a male model, with the consequences that the military has not only failed to
accommodate such factors as pregnancy and childrearing, but has offered them as reasons for excluding
women from combat. See Benecke, supra note 47, at 5-8. Benecke argues, however, that it is not
women's experience or characteristics but the military's institutional arrangements that make women's
perceived differences seem problematic for combat readiness. Benecke argues that the military should
replace the standard of male performance with "job-validated requirements for each specialty;"
accommodate pregnancy in the same manner as other "workaround" situations; and treat child care as
a family issue rather than a women's issue. Id.
48. See generally ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN
FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988); Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 2
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1988); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Thought,
42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
49. See Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47 (1988).
In the 60s and 70s, when women were depicted as competent workers who sought the opportunity to
perform the tasks that had been performed by men, women who remained at home to care for children
felt that their lives had been marginalized and devalued by the dominant characterization. Kathryn
Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices, 24 GA. L. REV. 761, 778 (1990). When anti-rape advocates
described women as victimized once by male aggression and once by the criminal justice system, black
women argued that this characterization neglected to present the divergent circumstances of their lives:
lives in which black women's rape had not until recently been criminalized, and in which the bias-laden
"myth of the black rapist" made enhanced prosecution efforts perilous for their husbands, sons, and
neighbors. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It Anyway? Feminist and Antiracist Appropriations
of Anita Hill, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER (Toni Morrison ed., 1992); Dowd Hall, The
Mind That Burns in Each Body: Women, Rape and Racial Violence, in THE POWERS OF DESIRE 328-49
(Ann Snitow et al. eds., 1983).
50. As Professor Anna Marie Smith has noted, through such images, a predominantly straight public
"gets the pleasure of an incredibly straight gay representation." Anna Marie Smith, Comments at
Women's Studies Colloquium, Cornell University (February 19, 1993).
Perhaps not surprisingly, this characterization may be applied to gay and lesbian soldiers who are,
in fact, forthcoming or even flamboyant about their sexual orientation. The "good soldier" depiction
of Perry Watkins in the various incarnations of the Watkins case contrasts sharply with his own self-
depiction in MARY ANN HUMPHREY, MY COUNTRY, MY RIGHT To SERVE (1990), in which he describes
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reform efforts the range of feminists who are more disturbed by an institutional
relationship between women and combat.51
Some unity in characterization may be necessary in order to put institutions
on notice regarding the features they will be obliged to accommodate. But the
rigidity and conformity of the "good soldier" model makes it of questionable
value in challenging the androcentric military norms.
III
INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
During his first week in office, President Clinton proposed an executive order
ending the ban on gays and lesbians in the military. That same week, a federal
district court held for the first time that the exclusion policy violates Equal
Protection. 2 Less than a year later, the Clinton Administration, its initiative
vitiated by a long struggle with the Senate and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
announced an anomalous compromise popularly known as "don't ask, don't tell."
Implementation of the policy was temporarily blocked by a sweeping injunction
issued by the same district court, which forbade any discrimination against gays
and lesbians by U.S. military forces. 3 This confluence of events frames nicely
himself as seeking out sexual encounters with other gay soldiers in a variety of settings, and of being paid
by the military to entertain the troops in drag. Id. at 252-54.
However, under the impending "don't ask, don't tell, don't pursue" policy, gay and lesbian soldiers
who are forthcoming in this way are subject to investigation regarding and separation for evidence of
homosexual conduct, notwithstanding the fact that their military performance may be exemplary.
51. One factor which has slowed women's mobilization in opposition to the combat exclusion was
the fact that women, and feminists, have varying views on the relationship between women and combat.
Some, who describe themselves as "equality" feminists, believe that women should be permitted to fight,
but that their entry into combat forces will not change the nature of or the decisions regarding armed
exchange. See Holm, supra note 34, at 394-97. Others, who might be described as "difference" or
"cultural" feminists, believe that women's distinctive modes of knowing and decisionmaking mean that
their addition to combat forces will change models of military decisionmaking. See Paula Lee Potts, Do
Women Belong in the Military? A Debate, MILITARY LIFESTYLE (Oct. 1989) at 46, 49 (citing M.C.
Devilbiss, a former Army officer now a NCO in the Air National Guard: By being allowed into combat
roles, women can demythologize the notion that the act of combat is heroic and glamorous. Combat
should be a last resort .... Women warriors know this."); Sara Ruddick, Drafting Women: Pieces of
a Puzzle, in CONSCRIPTS AND VOLUNTEERS 214, 229-38, (Robert K. Fullinwider ed., 1983) (arguing that
women, being socialized to "maternal thinking" and consequently "more peaceful" than men, "might
pacify the military and change the nature of battle"). Still others, who count themselves as "difference"
or "radical" feminists, argue that women's distinctive perspectives-borne of divergent epistemology or
the experience of male violence-should be used to keep the peace rather than to wage war; so that
moving women into combat should be a lower priority than working to prevent combat altogether. See
BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 117-31 (1984) (stating that women should
resist the urge to characterize violence and militarism as inherently masculine, but as victims of violence
should work-with men-to resist the use of violence as a form of social control); Ruddick, supra, at 231
(quoting Helen Caldicott as arguing that women in particular should do the work of peace because they
"understand the genesis of life"); Ann Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist
Jurisprudence as Oxymoron?, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 25 (1989) (arguing that women and lawyers
should learn pacifism and responsibility for government action from the Greenham Commons Women's
Peace Encampment).
52. Meinhold v. Department of Defense, 808 F. Supp. 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
53. See Meinhold v. Department of Defense, CV 92-6044 TJH, Amended Order and Judgment,
September 30, 1993 (unpublished order on file with author); Robert Reinhold, Los Angeles Portrait: A
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a final strategic question. There are numerous institutional avenues for
addressing military policies implicating gender, a fact which confronts advocates
with difficult choices. When the goal is not only to end discriminatory policies,
but to respond to such policies in ways that expose and combat institutional
androcentrism, the choices become more complicated. Both courts and elected
branch institutions have strengths and weaknesses in advancing this agenda, and
the best results may be achieved through combination and interaction among
them.
A. The Quandaries of Adjudication
For years it was assumed by gay and feminist advocates that changes in
policies, particularly those involving exclusion, would come from the courts. Not
only did the conservative tone of the Republican administrations and their
powerful record of vetoing congressional initiatives give partisan reasons to
doubt elected branch action but the political insulation of the courts, and their
history of protecting disempowered groups against majoritarian oppression,54
were thought to create independent institutional advantages. In the first flush
of the Clinton Administration, many of these conclusions were reversed: years
of struggle over civil rights remedies and years of conservative appointments
created greater ambivalence about the judiciary. Moreover, the energy and
activism of the new President inclined many advocates toward an electoral
branch solution. In fact, neither of these contrasting preferences has been fully
borne out. While it is difficult to talk about institutional powers in abstraction
from the question of who is exercising them, the courts have both strengths and
weaknesses for implementing a critique of androcentrism in the military.
The drawbacks of the courts may be more apparent at first glance. Primary
among them is a doctrinally entrenched posture of deference toward military
policy." This deference reflects first a lack of institutional competence: judges
Judge Who Challenges the System, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1993, at 18 (describing Judge Terry Hatter, Jr.'s
order, issued one day before the new policy was to go into effect on October 1). The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit declined to stay the district court's order pending appeal, which will be heard in
December. See Joan Biskupic, Administration Divided on Gays-Military Strategy; Pentagon Wants to
Seek Emergency Stay of Ruling, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1993, at A2. The Supreme Court, however, was
willing to stay the order, permitting the implementation of the policy. See Linda Campbell, Clinton Gay
Policy Gets Legal Alert, supra note 20. Weeks later, however, the policy received another challenge, this
time from a D.C. Court of Appeals opinion ordering the reinstatement of Joseph Steffan, who had been
forced to resign from the Naval Academy after telling a superior he was homosexual. See John
Lancaster & Michael York, Court Reinstates Gay Midshipman, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 1993, at Al.
54. For a more skeptical view of the power of courts to produce social change on behalf of
systematically disadvantaged groups, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE (1991).
55. The Seventh Circuit opinion in Ben-Shalom v. Marsh is illustrative:
[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have less
competence. The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition,
training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military
judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.
The ultimate responsibility for these decisions is appropriately vested in branches of the
government which are periodically subject to electoral accountability. It is this power of
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lack the information, or the processes for gathering it, that would facilitate
technical judgments about the nation's defense. But the courts' deference also
reflects a lack of institutional entitlement. The president and the Congress are
authorized by the Constitution 56 to supervise military decisionmaking in the
name of the people.17 The courts retain the responsibility to see that federal
law does not conflict with the requirements of the Constitution; yet this has
generally been viewed as a less direct warrant for intervention.
This deference is a particular problem where change requires unmasking
military androcentrism. One of the most powerful and self-entrenching features
of androcentrism is its tendency to present the partial view of those men in
control of an institution as objective reality. Exposing it means noting the
entanglement of conclusions driven by technical knowledge and conclusions
driven by attitudinal limitations. This task, challenging in any case, will be
virtually impossible where the supervising institution displays deference toward
military expertise. Determining whether a service chief's claim that gay soldiers
will destroy military discipline arises from his special knowledge of what
conduces to military discipline, or his unexamined sense that he has experienced
discipline only in (what he believed to be) all-heterosexual units, will be
impossible if courts believe that military judgments about any matter potentially
implicating expertise are entitled to deference.
Courts are also hampered in exposing androcentrism by the kind of reasoning
involved in equal protection analysis-the most likely kind of challenge to an
exclusionary policy to come before a court. Equal protection analysis employs
a categorical framework with three levels of scrutiny, which vary according to the
nature of the group affected. 8 The inquiry is directed first to whether the
group has "indicia of suspectness": historical, social, or political characteristics
which indicate vulnerability or a legacy of discrimination such as that experi-
enced by, for example, African-Americans.59 If such characteristics are present,
the policy or statute exposing the group to differentiating treatment is subjected
to heightened scrutiny, requiring stronger governmental justification, and a closer
relationship between the governmental goal invoked and the discriminating
classification employed. This analysis disserves efforts to expose military
androcentrism in several ways.
oversight and control of military force by elected representatives and officials which
underlies our entire constitutional system ....
881 F.2d 454, 466 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973)).
56. The Constitution makes the president the "Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy," U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, para. 1, and gives Congress the power to "raise and support armies," id. art. I, § 8,
para. 12-14.
57. This supervision may be exercised by Congress, through appropriations and other regulations,
as well as the power to hold investigatory hearings; civilian supervision may also be exercised by the
executive branch, through the president or the Department of Defense. For a fuller discussion of the
institutional vehicles for military supervision in the elected branches, see infra at 21-25.
58. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 532-33, 536-41, 572-81 (2d ed. 1991).
59. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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First, equal protection analysis reinforces rather than challenges androcentric
logic by focusing on characteristics of groups, rather than on systems of power,
and by suggesting that differences are inherent in excluded groups, rather than
constructed or highlighted by those in control of institutions. Moreover, because
equal protection analysis requires that each group alleging discrimination be
scrutinized independently, such analysis may inhibit the kind of juxtaposition of
different military policies that would help to expose the systematic character of
gender oppression. For example, while the (straight) women's combat exclusion
and the gay and lesbian exclusion might both reflect a straight, androcentric
attitude toward what conduces to discipline and reinforce traditional notions of
masculinity, the two exclusion policies affect distinct (albeit overlapping) groups,
and would be analyzed separately, according to the circumstances of each
group.'
Finally, by treating groups in categorical fashion, equal protection inhibits
characterizations that illuminate the multiplicity of excluded groups. Beyond
replicating the androcentric assumption that excluded groups should be defined
in relation to dominant groups (that is, as similar or as different), categorical
equal protection analysis runs all the risks of erasure of the experience of weaker
subgroups and privileging of that of more powerful subgroups that are inherent
in any unitary characterization of groups. An equal protection challenge to the
combat exclusion, which presented women as willing and able to serve, would
not be a useful vehicle for amplifying the voices of those who believe, for
example, that women should work for peace rather than fight wars, or that the
only justification for women's inclusion in combat is to transform the nature of
the enterprise.6'
Despite these drawbacks, however, the courts are not entirely unsuited for
playing a role in a challenge to military androcentrism. The political insulation
of courts remains a potential asset: they may be hampered by a doctrinal
command of deference, but they are not obliged to negotiate directly with those
who share current military attitudes, nor are they appointed by anyone who does.
60. In addition, in analyzing the circumstances of different groups, the Supreme Court (and to
somewhat lesser extent, other federal courts) have been increasingly reluctant to require strict or even
intermediate scrutiny for groups beyond the traditional range including blacks, women and aliens. See
generally STONE et al., supra note 58, at 753-57. These factors have meant, in practice, that the effort
to draw analogies between (straight) women and other groups entitled to heightened scrutiny, and gays
and lesbians, has been complicated and most often unsuccessful. See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881
F.2d 454, 465-66 (7th Cir. 1989); Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991).
61. Or, to highlight another kind of ambivalence blurred by such unitary categorizations, such a
challenge would not be a good vehicle for amplifying the voices of the substantial group of military
women who find the combat ban stigmatizing and inhibiting to their careers but do not themselves wish
to serve in the combat arms. A study published last year showed that, of 868 Army women surveyed,
54-60% believed that the combat exclusion hurt their chances of promotion, but 52% would leave the
service if they could be compelled to serve in combat roles, as men are. Approximately three quarters
of the women surveyed favored replacing the ban with voluntary combat duty for women. These
shadings of opinion might be reflected in elected branch deliberations but are utterly obliterated in an
equal protection challenge. See Eric Schmitt, Many Women in Army Favor Ending Combat Ban, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 1992, at A24.
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The lack of a legally sanctioned advisory role can function as a benefit as well.
Where courts are willing to undertake substantive scrutiny, their lack of
institutional acculturation to military arguments and viewpoints may make them
less likely to treat such perspectives as monolithic.
Such scrutiny may be rendered more likely by the fact that judicial deference,
potentially disabling though it may be, is discretionary in its application. Judicial
acquiescence in military expertise has been punctuated by occasional opinions
describing deference as little more than complicity in institutionalized preju-
dice.62 More recently, the district court in Meinhold took a step toward
rendering such intervention less idiosyncratic. It said that in evaluating military
rationales for discrimination against gays and lesbians, "the court cannot merely
defer, but must consider the factual basis underlying military judgment."63 This
approach not only combats reflexive deference but exposes division in military
opinion by examining the forces' inevitably diverse informational base.
Perhaps more importantly, federal lawsuits have recently become the site for
a highly innovative form of political organizing that may supply the oppositional
reasoning and portraiture that the substance of equal protection challenges lacks.
Perhaps, as feminist scholar Mary Katzenstein explains, challenges to the gay and
lesbian exclusion policy have become the occasion for a new form of political
theater, what she describes as an ingeniously choreographed "spectacle."'  As
lawyers file their equal protection challenges in court, their clients take their
cases on the road, appearing in public fora, coming out on the national news, and
even debating prominent military officials on "Nightline." As many of these
individuals are coming out for the first time, not only to a nation of strangers but
to family and friends, this public presentation contains a strain of personal
revelation that renders it immediate and riveting to thousands of viewers. Yet
in a more important sense, the images projected are anything but sensational.
The excluded servicemen and women are presented as clean-cut, capable, highly
accomplished soldiers-indistinguishable, on the one hand, from the myriad of
viewers watching them, but possessing sufficient military expertise, on the other,
to go toe-to-toe with the military officials with whom they are frequently paired.
The result is a powerful set of images of gays and lesbians, generated not by
those who wish to distance and devalue them, but by group members and their
political allies themselves. These images are aimed not at the courts, or even at
the political branches, but at the public, which directly or indirectly influences
both.
These images present a powerful challenge to the logic and the substance of
military androcentrism. They challenge the universality or objectivity of the
62. See Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1349-51 (9th Cir. 1988); Owens v. Brown,
455 F. Supp. 291, 299-303 (D.C.D.C. 1978).
63. Meinhold v. Department of Defense, 808 F. Supp. 1455, 1458 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
64. Mary Katzenstein, The Spectacle as Political Resistance: Feminist and Gay/Lesbian Politics in the
Military, 11 MINERVA 1 (1993). See also William Rubinstein, Challenging the Military's Antilesbian and
Antigay Policy, 1 LAw & SEXUALrrY 239,261-65 (1991) (review of Allen Berube, COMING OUT UNDER
FIRE).
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official military view-both of gays and lesbians and of appropriate military
policy. They challenge the ostensible need for a ban on gays and lesbians, from
the perspective not of an outsider but of one who fully understands the
requirements of the military task. When discharged Naval Academy midshipman
Joseph Steffan states on "20/20" that "I've been showering with men since I was
playing basketball in elementary school. It's something I can deal with.. ,65
viewers realize-at the least-that military officials' monumental concern with
heterosexual "privacy" is only one vantage point on the subject. Moreover, the
monolithic military image of the "overt homosexual" is undermined by the image
of these recognizable men and women who are characterized not by a predatory
lust for heterosexual soldiers but by a commitment to military institutions and
a desire to serve. At the level of logic, these images make visible the partiality
of dominant views, and confront the dominant practice of constructing gays and
lesbians in relation to straight men, rather than as subjects in their own right.
These gay and lesbian soldiers, though they have been excluded from their
chosen vocation, are subjects in control of their own self-presentation, a
revelation that calls the dominant androcentric patterns into question.
These oppositional presentations are not without dangers. In some cases,
they seem to perpetuate the image of the "good soldier." Not only are these
individuals almost uniformly standouts in their military fields, but they project
little sexuality whatsoever; some, like Joseph Steffan, express "disgust" at having
to "wear their sexuality on their sleeves." Their presentation is far from the
more complex self-revelation one finds in a collection like My Country, My Right
to Serve, where gay soldiers tell of entertaining the troops in drag, or initiating
sexual encounters with other military men.' Yet the "good soldier," self-
presented on "20/20" or "Nightline" may offer several advantages over the "good
soldier" invoked in equal protection challenges or in testimony by advocacy
groups. Even where the image presented has little complexity, an image
presented simultaneously on hundreds of thousands of television sets across the
nation has some hope of competing with the images constructed and disseminat-
ed by military leaders. More frequently, the images are more complex and
challenging than the foregoing reservation suggests. The "good soldier" who
engages in public debate with the military brass, and who can speak to the
challenge of showering with other men, is a "good soldier" with a difference.
The incongruity or apparent contradiction among the different features of this
image helps trigger the recharacterization that nondominant groups seek.
B. Enter the Electoral Branches
The electoral branches have their own advantages and drawbacks in
challenging the androcentrism of military institutions. As a formal matter, they
lack the tradition of institutional deference that has frequently paralyzed the
65. 20/20 (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 29, 1991).
66. HUMPHREY, supra note 50, at 252-54.
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judiciary in addressing discrimination by the military. The president is the
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces-a position that Truman exploited as
he desegregated the armed forces by executive order, and on which Clinton
hoped to capitalize in his early weeks in office. Congress and the Department
of Defense provide civilian supervision to the military services, carrying out a
constitutional responsibility not only to assist them but to keep them accountable
to the people. This position has given elected branch officials the authority to
challenge military judgments; it has enabled them to develop the expertise that
has made them feel comfortable in so doing. This authority and expertise can
fuel a kind of independent judgment that is capable of separating the opinions
of military leaders from "the best defense" of the nation.
In addition, the review of military policy by the elected branches may be
conducted through a range of different bodies. Military policy may be altered
through the imposition of an executive order. Congress may hold hearings in
connection with the passage of legislation, such as the 1974 hearings on
legislation which permitted women to enter the service academies,67 or in
connection with appropriations, such as those sought by President Carter for
registration for the draft.' The Department of Defense may issue directives to
the services, as when the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
instructed the services to eliminate unnecessary regulatory distinctions between
men and women, and recommend legislation to correct inequities.69 Advisory
Committees, such as the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services
("DACOWITS")," can also be established by or within the executive branch.
The varying backgrounds and constituencies of different elected branch
groups tend to enhance the chances of reform-oriented action.7" More
importantly, the flexible investigatory format of many of these bodies means that
67. Hearings were held in the House Armed Services Committee on the legislation, which was
ultimately attached as an amendment to a defense appropriations bill. See HOLM, supra note 34, at 307-
10.
68. Hearings were held in 1980, by subcommittees of both the House and the Senate Armed
Services Committees. The Carter Administration's proposal to register women would also have required
an amendment to the Military Selective Service Act. See id. at 357-60.
69. See id. at 265 (describing letter to services from Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower
and Reserve Affairs Roger T. Kelley).
70. DACOWITS was established by the Department of Defense in 1951 to help the services recruit
more women (during the Korean War) and to provide a "public relations vehicle" for women's programs
within the military. DEVILBISS, supra note 3, at 10.
71. At the most basic level, the multiplicity of supervisory avenues increases the likelihood of a
challenge to discriminatory policies from some quarter. The "witch hunts" conducted by several services
to expose and expel alleged lesbians attracted little attention among elected branch supervisory bodies.
See Michelle Benecke & Kirstin Dodge, Military Women in Nontraditional Job Fields: Casualties of the
Armed Forces' War on Homosexuals, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 215 (1990). Yet DACOWITS was
persuaded, after complicated discussions with feminist advocates, that the practice implicated the interests
of women as a group, whether they were subject to exclusion or not. See DACOWITS, 1988 Spring
Conference (April 16-20, 1988). Perhaps more importantly, the overlapping jurisdiction of supervisory
bodies means that one body can given impetus to another in demanding reform. House hearings chaired
in 1972 by Representative Otis Pike, which were highly critical of the attitudes of the services concerning
the utilization of women, strengthened the hand of the Defense Department in demanding an end to
discriminatory regulations. See HOLM, supra note 34, at 265.
[Vol. 56: No. 4
GENDER IN THE MILITARY
a critique of androcentrism can more readily be voiced. Supervisory bodies are
not hampered by the judicial constraint to address only those issues brought
before them; they may initiate inquiry and determine the scope of their own
investigations. Moreover, elected branch intervention need not replicate the
errors of androcentric logic under the auspices of categorical equal protection
argumentation. Inquiry need not be limited to the characteristics of affected
groups, but may extend to the structure and uses of power within the services.72
And some supervisory formats, such as congressional hearings, permit compari-
son of different gender-related policies, as a way of unearthing more systematic
problems in military institutions.73
Finally, the flexible investigatory formats and the multiplicity of avenues for
supervision militates against the unitary characterization of either military
viewpoints or affected groups. Legislative hearings provide civilian officials a
chance to hear from a range of military leaders, amplifying whatever diversity of
views exists and combatting the impression of a monolithic or universal military
judgment on the measures that serve the national defense.74 Hearings may also
produce multiple, dissimilar images of the group in question. In congressional
hearings on the admission of women to the service academies, Representatives
Stratton and Wilson emphasized the ability of women to perform like men (the
latter even suggesting that this would be possible in combat situations), while
Representative Abzug argued that women would bring "a new insight and a new
direction toward strategy and tactics."75 And the multiplicity increases as one
takes in the images projected by different institutions: the view of women as
potential combatants projected by DACOWITS is different from the view of
72. The Pike Subcommittee Report, for example, focused not on the characteristics of women but
on the attitudes and practices that hindered their effective utilization in the services. See HOLM, supra
note 34, at 249-50.
73. During House Armed Services Committee hearings on sexual harassment in July 1992, for
example, several witnesses, including Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Jr. USN (Ret.) and Major General Jeanne
Holm USAF (Ret.), raised the relation between the combat exclusion and the unequal and sexualized
treatment of military women. PANEL ON DEFENSE POLICY AND THE SUBCOMM. ON MILITARY
PERSONNEL AND COMPENSATION OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES: Women in the Military:
Dealing With Sexual Harassment The 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1993). The Report reflects an approach
broadly critical of the androcentrist military bent in that it calls for systematic "cultural change" in the
military. Id. at 3.
74. The 1979 House Armed Services Committee hearings on the repeal of §§ 6015 and 8549, for
example, reflected a variety of views on the merits of statutorily excluding women from assignment to
vessels or aircraft that engage in combat missions. See Holm, supra note 34, at 338-45. Holm emphasizes
that many who testified in favor of repeal of the statutes did not favor the eligibility of women for
combat. Some believed that women should be eligible to serve on combat vessels or aircraft during
peacetime, or that service chiefs should have discretion to make assignments not permitted under the
statutes, id. at 339; others believed that combat exclusion in the Navy and Air Force should be
implemented by service policy, as in the Army, id. Some military officers did, however, testify that
women should be permitted in combat. Id. at 340-41. The hearings adjourned without decision on
repeal; this action had to await the current administration.
75. See 121 CONG. REC. 15455 (1975), reprinted in Louis FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL
DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 328-29 (1992). Representative McDonald also opposed the
amendment permitting admission on the grounds that women's biological differences in relation to
childbearing would make them unable to function in the same way as military men. 121 CONG. REC.
at 15453-54.
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women as potential combatants projected by the recent Presidential Advisory
Commission. Moreover, the frequent solicitation of testimony by members of
affected groups mean that these groups are at least partly responsible for the
images presented, a development that contests the dominant groups' construction
of the "other" under androcentrism.
Not all elected branch characteristics, however, serve the effort to challenge
military androcentrism. As the recent controversy over gay and lesbian exclusion
reveals, institutional strengths can become weaknesses given the wrong personnel
or combination of circumstances. The political character of these institutions
may theoretically be authorizing, but it can also be practically disenabling.
President Clinton-long embattled by the military-felt obliged to respond to the
firestorm of objections to his proposed order with compromises which left
androcentric assumptions intact. Moreover, as Clinton learned when he faced
the challenge of Senator Sam Nunn,76 the ability of electoral institutions to
nudge and check each other can be an impediment as well as a spur to change.
The same can be said of congressional supervisory expertise. Through their close
working relationship with the military services, congressional committees can be
instilled with the same attitudes that circumscribe the "technical expertise" of the
military. Nunn's opposition might be explained on the ground that his
commitment to the acquisition of military expertise made him unable to see
alternatives to the perspectives of ranking military leaders.
In the end, the most productive approach may lie in a combination of judicial
and elected branch influences: a strategic interaction between the executive, the
Congress, the courts, and the public.' Such collaboration has already been a
pattern in gender-related military reform: a change in service policies making
separation for pregnancy voluntary rather than mandatory was accomplished
through a combination of litigation, general publicity, and intervention by the
Department of Defense.7" Such a combination may be particularly useful in
reform efforts aimed at exposing military androcentrism. Elected branch
mechanisms bring the advantages of flexibility and "jurisdictional redundan-
cy" 79; they also contest the unanimity and aperspectivity of military judgments,
and proliferate a range of nonunitary images of affected groups. But while
executive and legislative institutions may be more effective at illuminating the
androcentrism implicit in military practices, they may have drawbacks in
initiating a process of systematic change. Judicial decisions are better insulated
from pressures to compromise; their conclusive interpretation of the highest law
of the land may be more effective in instigating reform. They also may
command public attention and combat "other-ization" through media "specta-
76. See Wines, supra note 17.
77. For a useful discussion of such combinations or collaborations in producing social change in a
variety of areas, see Neal Devins, Judicial Matters, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1027 (1992) (review of Gerald N.
Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?).
78. See STIEHM, supra note 5, at 115-19; HOLM, supra note 34, at 291-303.
79. Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology and Innovation, 22
WM. & MARY L. REv. 639 (1981).
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cles" enabling litigants to construct their own self-images. A simultaneous
institutional consideration of specific military policies affecting gender might
permit one set of institutions to supply the defects of the other.
For example, as the President, the Department of Defense, and the Senate
Armed Services Committee began to work with the services on the proposed
executive order, they might have been assisted by the declaration of unconstitu-
tionality handed down in Meinhold. Although Meinhold was a lower court
opinion, its conclusion that the exclusion policy violates the Fourteenth
Amendment could have played a subtle yet important role in the difficult
negotiations ahead. It could have strengthened the hand of the President,
enabling him to resist compromises that too closely resembled reinstatement of
the ban, by asserting the dubious constitutionality of the courses proposed. The
positive media images of Keith Meinhold invoked by the case might have helped
problematize official perspectives and fuel public pressure on Senate leaders to
ease their opposition to the President.
President Clinton made no effort to exploit the opinion in this way; rather,
he permitted himself to be pressured into a compromise reviled by many of his
erstwhile supporters. Yet gay and lesbian advocates seem better to have
understood the benefits of a multi-branch approach. Failing to persuade the
President to hold to his initial pledge, they returned to the courts: Keith
Meinhold persuaded Judge Hatter to extend his earlier order. By enjoining as
unconstitutional a range of potential actions against gay and lesbian soldiers,
Judge Hatter may force contending parties back to the bargaining table, and give
gay and lesbian advocates an opportunity for a fuller elected-branch hearing.
IV
CONCLUSION
Discrimination against nonconforming groups by an androcentric military is
unlikely to be resolved overnight. Partial, gendered norms that measure
performance and limit accommodation are strongly entrenched. It is easy, and
not always inappropriate, for military officials to invoke their technical
understanding of the defense needs of the nation. Yet the political mobilization
of straight women, gays, and lesbians, and the distinguished performance of
members of these groups in conflicts such as the Gulf War, have brought a range
of policies under scrutiny. The goals of combatting the invisible perspectivity of
military leaders, and correcting distorted images of excluded groups, may help
organize government officials and active citizens in criticizing these policies and
demanding their transformation.
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